Application Letter, Resume, Follow Up Letter Essay

Application Letter, Resume, Follow Up Letter - Essay Example I also possess skills in mentoring and counseling through the long years of social service activities in the Girls Scout movement. I have over 5 years of work experience in customer care and frontline operations in banking and other field of business and possess excellent interpersonal and communications skills, which I have developed and sharpened during my career. I am positive that my extrovert personality with commitment for excellence will allow me to integrate well in to the Titans culture which is known to be a community designed by employees who expect to achieve excellence. Enclosed herewith is a brief resume of my work experience and educational background. Personal bio data with reference contacts can be provided upon request. I am most keen in receiving a positive feedback for my application and look forward to hearing from you. First of all, I would like to express my appreciation for the job interview that was granted to me upon reviewing my application for the post of Human Resources Manager. I am delighted to hear of being selected for the position and wish to thank you for the attractive offer of employment made. I am available for taking up the new position on immediate basis upon my confirmation of accepting the offer. However, I would like to request for a period of one week from today, to confirm my acceptance of the job offer. As mentioned in the interview, I have applied for similar positions in two other companies and both are based in my home state, Maryland. The two firms have indicated that they will be notifying me of their decision not later than 20th of November and therefore, I would like to await their decision prior to accepting the offer from Titan Corporation. I must however express clearly, my enthusiasm of joining your firm, which offers a unique opportunity in terms of the specialized nature of business in which the firm operates as well as the prospects of serving the human resource

Pilot Fatigue in Aviation Essay Example for Free

Pilot Fatigue in Aviation Essay Aviation transport is said to be the safest transportation method by man but is challenged by incidents and accidents that resulted to tragic loss of lives and damage to properties. One very important reason that is being looked upon by aviation and concerned authorities like the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is of man’s physiological limitation which is fatigue. Pilot fatigue is highly blamed in most aviation accidents over the years. The risk of accident is said to be high if the pilot is deprived of sleep. Sleep is a vital physiological function, and obtaining even one hour less than required can increase waking sleepiness (Air Line Pilot, November 1994, page 22). Sleep loss can be acute and if continued over time may result in a cumulative sleep debt. Cumulative sleep loss and disruption of 24-hour biological, or circadian rhythms can lead to decreased waking alertness, impaired performance, and altered mood. Fatigue is the symptom often reported to characterize the sum of these negative experiences. Sleep-deprived personnel lose approximately 25% to 30% of their ability to perform useful mental work with each 24-hour period of sleep loss (Johnston III, S. L. , 2005). In fact, a 2003 study on the impact of fatigue on F-117 pilots revealed that 27-33 hours of sleep deprivation (1 night of sleep loss) degrade basic piloting skills by more than 40% below normal (Johnston III, S. L, 2005). For this reason, NASA and FAA has collaborated to do research programs on this safety concern. The NASA Ames Fatigue/Jet Lag Program (now the Fatigue Countermeasures Program) was jointly funded by the FAAs Human Factors Research Program for many years (Mann, M. B. , www. hq. nasa. gov). The results of its research have determined that fatigue is really needed to be addressed to maintain the safety of aviation personnel to prevent loss of lives and properties. How to address then fatigue as a safety concern? It is unfortunate that there is no one simple solution because fatigue has multitudes of causes. For NASA’s Fatigue Countermeasures Program, the approach is said to be multi-faceted and comprehensive yet must be an integrated approach. Accordingly, it should have at least the following components: education and training, hours of service, sound scheduling practices, effective countermeasures, incorporation of appropriate design and technologies, and research (Mann, M. B. , www. hq. nasa. gov). Education and Training. Education establishes the knowledge base for the successful acceptance of all other activities. In 1994, NASA has developed an education and training module on alertness management in flight operation. This module was in use by already at least 149 organizations reaching more than 116,000 crewmembers in 1998 (Mann, M. B. , www. hq. nasa. gov). Hours of Service. Principles and guidelines for duty and rest scheduling must be developed. The latest scientific research on fatigue must be incorporated and reflected to these guidelines and principles as needed. Sound Scheduling Practices. Sound scheduling practices should include scientific information about sleep, fatigue, and circadian rhythms, in addition to other factors, in creating and evaluating flight crew schedules. Countermeasures. An integrated approach calls for making full use of personal, corporate, and even regulatory countermeasure strategies. These strategies can be implemented preventively, using them before duty and on layovers to reduce the effects of fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption during flight operations. As per study by the Fatigue Countermeasures Program, Flight crews receiving brief hourly activity breaks (involving mild physical activity and social interaction) showed improved physiological alertness for at least 15 minutes relative to a control group, while reporting significantly greater alertness for up to 25 minutes post-break. Design and Technology. The aviation industry must tap advances in design and technology to address this safety concern of fatigue. It is said that technology has changed or evolved dramatically over the past decades but man’s need for sleep did not. Good system design incorporates information about human physiology, its limitations and strengths, early in the process. Technological approaches that use this information can take many forms, including flight crew scheduling algorithms (i. e. , the methodology of choosing flight crews) and alertness monitoring/management systems (Mann, M. B. , www. hq. nasa. gov). . Research. Continues research on this area of concern must be done. More research is needed to fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the human sleep and circadian systems. With the advent of technological devices claiming to detect fatigue, a focused research is needed to ascertain the sensitivity, the reliability and the validity of these devices. Continued research is also essential to address regulatory, scheduling, and countermeasure questions. It has been said that decision making and policy is guided by a valid and empirical data obtained through research (Mann, M. B. , www. hq. nasa. gov). Pilot fatigue then in aviation, if not completely eliminated, is greatly reduced to obtain peak performance of pilots by integrating the above suggested components. With peak performance of pilots, safety in aviation is greatly improved. . References Air Line Pilot, November 1994, Fatigue in Aviation, page 22, by the Flight Management and Human Factors Division, NASA Ames Research Center. Retrieved June 9, 2009, http://cf. alpa. org/internet/projects/ftdt/alpmag/FATIGUE. html Johnston III, S. L. Societal and Workplace Consequences of Insomnia, Sleepiness, and Fatigue. (Sept. 29, 2005). Retrieved June 9, 2009. http://cme. medscape. com/viewarticle/513572_print Mann, M. B. , â€Å"Hearing on Pilot Fatigue†. Retrieved June 9, 2009 http://www. hq. nasa. gov/office/legaff/mann8-3. html

Fear and Loathing On the Campaign Trail 821772 :: Essays Papers

Fear and Loathing On the Campaign Trail 821772 I knew I was in for something different before even opening the book. On the cover of the book was a skull colored by the American flag, with swastikas in its eye sockets. I wasn’t quite sure what to expect, as I had no idea who Hunter S. Thompson was. I opened the book and began to read through the author’s preface. Throughout were numerous references to drugs, sex, and politics. I began to get a picture of who HST was and about his style of writing. HTS revolutionized modern journalism with a style all his own. He evolved a new style of journalism called â€Å"Gonzo† journalism. This bold and brazen style of journalism is the telling of the blatant truth with no thought of consequence. According to Thompson "The true Gonzo reporter needs the talent of a master journalist, the eye of an artist/photographer and the heavy balls of an actor.† A gonzo journalist does not proofread his work, because that would take away from the spontaneous of the event. A Gonzo journalist will witness an event, and either at the time of it, or shortly thereafter completely write about it. When written at an event, "The reporter works his fingers to bloody nubs trying to capture all that is happening around him, and then sends it off to the editor without a second look.† Bill Cardoso a close friend of HTS’ coined the term "gonzo" in a letter regarding an article written about the Kentucky Derby in which he wrote: "The Kentucky Derby is Decadent and Depraved", and was more about white trash than horses. Cardoso wrote, "I don't know what the f*** you're doing, but you've changed everything. It's totally gonzo". Cardoso, himself a journalist, claims that "gonzo" is actually a corruption of a French Canadian word, "gonzeaux", meaning, "shining path". Gonzo journalism is also highly subjective. When a Gonzo style article is written, it is clearly known where the writer stands on the topic of the article. You become immersed in the writer’s feelings, thoughts, and views on whatever is being written about. HST is constantly extremely critical and scrutinizes every situation he ends up in with a sarcastic, humorous and/or vulgar twist. I enjoy this part of his writing because it makes everything more interesting to read.

Strategic Management and Swot Analysis

Contents: I. INTRODUCTION a. Brand Extension for L’OREAL II. LITERATURE REVIEW a. Ansoff Matrix b. SWOT Analysis c. BCG Matrix III. REFLECTIVE STATEMENT IV. REFERENCES Brand Extension for L’OREAL Brand extension takes place whenever a company wants to enter a new market by using the name of one of its existing brands, rather than using a new one. Especially the luxury sector takes advantage of its well-known brand names when it comes to launching new products into new markets (Kapferer, 2008, p. 295).The popularity of brand extension strategy is due to the belief that it leads to higher consumer trial than the use of a new brand name because of the awareness levels of the brand name being leveraged (Keller, 2003, p. 582). L’Oreal as a global brand is known for high quality cosmetic goods like make-up and hair care products for women, men and kids. Its mission â€Å"Beauty for all† connects with the company’s slogan â€Å"Because you're worth itâ₠¬ , which is used in nearly every single L’Oreal advertisement.To identify all the different products of the brand’s portfolio they utilize the same logo for all of their goods by adapting to the specific field (L’Oreal homepage, 2012). Considering L’Oreal’s image of good appearance we decided to extend the brand by entering a new market with a new product. The diversification L’Oreal shoes should be placed in the customer products area with a target group of professional women. The leather shoes should be available for middle to high income consumers. Though the price is affordable for this group of customers the quality is still high.With this strategy we want to cover the needs of the existing customers and reach out for new potential clients. On one hand we intend to increase our sales and profits; on the other hand we use the good reputation of L’Oreal to get our new product connected to the values of the umbrella brand. To make sure that we created a new logo keeping the traditional L’Oreal letters with a reference to the shoe sector as shown in (image 1). Meanwhile, we forecast that L’Oreal shoes can strengthen the global brand in future.Image 1: Traditional L’Oreal letters mentioning the new sector Brief Literature Review Before putting theory into practice every company needs to consider its internal and external situation. In this part, three marketing theories will be applied to L’OREAL. These are: The Ansoff matrix, the SWOT analysis and the BCG matrix. Ansoff matrix is a model that helps firms to outline the range of marketing options open to them (Riley, 2012). L’Oreal shoes classified as a diversification was made according to the Ansoff matrix.A diversification is described as a new product for a new market. L’Oreal added shoes to its existing product range, left the skin and hair care market and entered the new footwear area. Image 2: Ansoff matrix With the SWOT Analysis we could discover our strengths and weaknesses, and identify both the opportunities and the threats for L’Oreal. In other words, as Renault stated â€Å"A SWOT is to reveal positive forces that work together and potential problems that need to be addressed or at least recognized†.Comparing the strengths to the weaknesses for L’Oreal shoes we have to mention that the variety of suppliers and the competitive quality price relation of the product overweight the missing expertise in the shoe sector. The opportunity of using the strong image of L’Oreal and the fact that there are no other middle price shoes in our own umbrella brand product range can be used to attract new customers. Taking into account that the economic situation has changed and people are not willing to spend as much as they did before the recession took place (Price, 2012).Using the BCG Matrix a company can recognize if a product is profitable or not. It can be helpful if a company has to decide whether investing additional resources in a certain product or services. There are four categories developed to the relative market share and market growth rate: star, cash cow, poor dog, question mark (Lu ; Zhao, 2006). A star is a product with a high market share and a high market growth rate. With this kind of product the company gains revenue. Therefore, a star can be used to support weaker sectors. These products with a low market growth rate and a low market share are called poor dogs.Cash cows are well-established with a high market share but as the market growth rate is low the company has to be aware of limited opportunities. Those limitations do not exist for question marks as they are located in high growth markets with a low market share. These unknown new products like L’oreal shoes do have the potential to establish and become stars or even cash cows. In future they could be able to promote weaker sectors and create a trade-off (Lu ; Zah o, 2006) ;;; I found another website to reference these two paragraphs From which website did you get this?! gt;;;; According to the Internet Center for Management and Business Administration (2012) the BSG matrix is limited. The different products in a company’s portfolio cannot be taken as independent; they are related to each other. This has to be taken into consideration when it comes to the question whether you keep or you eliminate a product. Reflective Statement To develop the topic we firstly did some research about the definition of brand extension and L’Oreal as a company.We discovered that creating a brand extension for L’Oreal is a difficult task as the umbrella brand already covers a lot of sectors in the beauty and care area. We thought about a product that would fit into the enterprise’s image of beauty and decided to choose shoes for middle-aged professional women. We looked into several marketing theories to support our decision such as t he SWOT analysis, Ansoff matrix, and the BCG matrix. However, we discovered that The SWOT analysis is the most helpful theory for our research.Since L’OREAL shoes classified as diversification, the SWOT analysis helped us to discover our brand’s current strengths and weaknesses; as well as the potential opportunities and threats that we might find in the future. This made it easier for us to set our brand’s short term and long term goals. References: Collett, S. (1999). Business Planning, E-journal of SWOT Analysis, 33(29), 58. Retrieved November 05, 2012, from http://jr3tv3gd5w. search. serialssolutions. com/ Hussey, D. (1999). Strategic Change, E-journal of Igor Ansoff's Continuing Contribution to Strategic Management, 8(7), 05.Retrieved November 06, 2012, from http://onlinelibrary. wiley. com/doi/10. 1002/(SICI)1099-1697(199911)8:7%3C375::AID-JSC462%3E3. 0. CO;2-U/pdf Kapferer, J. N. (2008). The New Strategic Brand Management: Advanced Insights and Strategic Thinking. London: Kogan Page. Keller, Kevin L. (2003). Strategic Brand Management. (2nd ed. ). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Lu, H. & Zhao, L. (2006). INTEGRATING GIS AND BCG MODEL FOR MARKETING STRATEGIC PLANNING. 14(18), 02-04. Retrieved November 06, 2012, from http://iceb. nccu. edu. tw/proceedings/APDSI/2006/718-725. df Price, E. (2012). A reduction in European over-consumption will be undone by any Eurozone solution. Retrieved November 01, 2012, from http://blogs. lse. ac. uk/europpblog/2012/07/23/eurozone-over-consumption/ Riley, J. (2012). Ansoff Matrix. Retrieved November 07, 2012, from http://www. tutor2u. net/business/strategy/ansoff_matrix. htm Renault, V. (n. d. ). SWOT Analysis: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. Retrieved November 08, 2012, from http://ctb. ku. edu/en/tablecontents/sub_section_main_1049. aspx

Competition Between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects

t American Economic Association Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects Author(s): Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar. , 1998), pp. 33-62 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/116817 . Accessed: 01/02/2011 12:55 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www. jstor. org/page/info/about/policies/terms. jsp.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=aea. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email  protected] org. American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Economic Review. http://www. jstor. org CompetitionBetween Privateand Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-GroupEffectsBy DENNIS EPPLE AND RICHARD E. ROMANO* A theoretical and computational model with tax-financed, tuition-free public schools and competitive, tuition-financedprivate schools is developed. Students differ by ability and income. Achievement depends on own ability and on peers' abili ties. Equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and twodimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income. In private schools, high-ability, low-income students receive tuition discounts, while lowability, high-income students pay tuition premia.Tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting, and benefit high-ability students relative to low-ability students. (JEL H42, 128) Discontent in the United States with the primary and secondary educational system has become the norm. The decline in SAT scores in the 1970's, embarrassinginternationalcomparisons of student achievement, slow growth in productivity measures, and increasing disparity in earnings all call into question the quality of the educational system. ‘ Education policy figured prominently in recenit presidential elections.The debate has centered on issues of school choice, including voucher systems (Karen De Witt, 1992). Typical vouch er proposals provide students attending private schools a tax-financed, school-redeemable voucher of fixed amount toward (or possibly covering) tuition. Although a 1993 California referendumfor vouchers was defeated, policy change at state and local levels abounds, as does change in the private educational sector. The state of Minnesota and school districts in 30 states allow residents to choose the public school their children attend. 2The city of Milwaukee introduced a voucher system in the 1989-1990 school year.A -number f private o school and private-public school initiatives are developing (see e. g. , John F. Witte et al. , 1993; Steve Forbes, 1994; Steven Glazerman and RobertH. Meyer, 1994; Joe Nathan, 1994; Newsweek, 1994; Wall Street Journal, 1994; Steven Baker, 1995; Jay P. Green et al. , 1996). Educational reform emphasizing increased school competition with an increased * Epple: GraduateSchool of IndustrialAdministration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; Romano: Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.We greatly appreciate the comments of Linda Argote, Richard Arnott, Lawrence Kenny, Tracy Lewis, David Sappington, Suzanne Scotchmer, and three anonymous referees, in addition to workshop participants at Carnegie Mellon University, Florida State University, Indiana University, Northwestern University, Princeton University, the University of Chicago, the University of Colorado, the University of Florida, the University of Illinois, the University of Kansas, the University of Virginia, Yale University, the 1993 Public Choice meetings, and the 1994 American Economic Association meetings.We thank the National Science Foundation, and Romano thanks the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Florida for financial support. Epple acknowledges the supportof Northwestern University, where some of this research was conducted. Anv errors are ours. 2 Public funding of nonsecular schools and considerable fre edom of school choice has been practicedfor years in England (Daphne Johnson, 1990) and much of Canada (Nick Kach and Kas Mazurek, 1986). These choice systems support horizontal differentiation in schooling and safeguards exist to limit vertical (quality) differentiation.Our analysis is concerned primarily with the effects of a voucher system on vertical differentiation. ‘The provocatively titled report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983), A Nation at Risk, details the decline of performance of U. S. students in the 1970's. More recent data can be found in Daniel M. Koretz ( 1987). Modest gains in performanceon standardized achievement tests, followed by a leveling off, well below peak scores of the early 1960's, characterizes the late 1980's and 1990's. 33 34 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW role of the private sector is at the forefront of he policy debate and recent policy initiatives. The modern economic case for vouchers and increased educational choice was made by Milton Friedman (1962). The academic educational and political-science professions have since considered the pros and cons of voucher systems and educational choice (John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, 1978; Myron Liberman, 1989; John Chubb and Terry Moe, 1990). Economic analysis of the interaction between public and private schools, and of related policy instrumentslike vouchers, is only beginning to emerge. This paper continues the study of the â€Å"market† for ducation by developing a model that focuses on the interactionbetween the public and private educational sectors and also examines the consequences of vouchers. We describe the equilibrium characteristics of the market for education with an open-enrollmentpublic sector and a competitive private sector. Our model embodies two key elements of the educational process. First, students differ in their abilities. Higher ability is assumed to increase a student's educational achievement and that of peers in the school attended. Second, households differ in their incomes, with higher income increasing the demand for educational achievement.A studentin our model is then characterizedby an ability and a household income, a draw from a continuous bivariate distribution. A school's quality is determined by the mean ability of the student body, reflecting the model's peer-groupeffect. We characterizethe equilibriumdistributionof studenttypes across public and private schools and examine the tuition structure of private schools, assuming that student types are verifiable. We develop a theoretical and computational model in parallel, with the latter calibrated to existing estimates of parameter values. Equilibria are simulated for a range of voucher values.Key characteristicsof an equilibriumare the following. A hierarchyof school qualities will be present, with the set of (homogeneous) public schools having the lowest-ability peer group and a strict ability-groupranking of private schools. T he equilibrium student bodies of schools correspond to a partition of the ability-income-type space of students with MARCH 1998 stratification by income and, in many cases, stratificationby ability. As Figure 1 from our computational model illustrates, type space is then carved into diagonal slices with each higher slice making up a private school's student body and with the bottom lice comprising the public sector. The normality of demand for a good peer group leads relatively high-income studentsto cross subsidize the schooling of relatively high-ability students, producing the latter partition. Private schools attract high-ability, low-income students by offering them tuition discounts, sometimes fellowships. Even with free entry, schools price discriminate by income against students who are not on the margin between switching schools. The equilibrium differentiation of schools and economies of scale in education preclude perfect competition for every type of student.Nevertheless , this price discriminationdoes not disrupt the internalization of the peer-group externality by private schools. An equilibrium without a public sector is Paretoefficient given the equilibrium number of schools. Because free public schools do not price the peer-group externality, an equilibriumwith public schools is Pareto inefficient. In the computational model, we employ a Cobb-Douglas specification of utility and educational achievement which incorporatesthe peer-group effect. The parameters are calibrated to U. S. data from various sources. We compute approximate equilibria for voucher alues ranging from $0 to $4,200 per student ($4,222 equals the expenditure per student in public schools in 1988). ‘ With no vouchers, the predicted percentage of students in the public sector is 90 percent (the actual value for the United States is 88 percent). As the voucher is increased, the size of and mean ability in the public sector decrease. With a $2,000 voucher, for example, the p ercentage of students remaining in the public sector equals 70 percent, and the mean ability declines by 15. 8 percent. 3 The integer number of private schools in our model precludes existence of competitive equilibrium except in special cases.This integer problem and our approximation approachare discussed later in the paper. VOL. 88 NO. 1 EPPLE AND ROMANO:PRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION The entry of private schools and consequent more efficient sorting of students across schools caused by vouchers increases average welfare (and achievement) only a little in our computational model, while having larger distributional effects. As we discuss in detail later, the magnitude of the aggregate effect depends on the extent of complementarity of peer ability and own ability in the educational production function. There is little empirical evidence to guide assessment of the extent of uch complementarity. The voucher increases the premium to ability in private schools. The largest proport ionate gains from the voucher then accrue to low-income, high-ability students. For example, a household with income of $10,000 and student with ability at the 95th percentile has a welfare gain of about 7. 5 percent of income from a $2,000 voucher. Students of low income and low ability who remain in the public sector when a $2,000 dollar voucher is available experience small welfare losses but make up a majority. It bears emphasizing that our model takes public and private schools to be equally effective providers of education, however.Some argue that private schools are more productive and that the competitive effect of a voucher program will increase public-school effectiveness. 4 For example, Hoxby (1996) concludes from her empirical investigation that competition-induced performance improvement would increase public-school achievement by more than enough to offset 4 Caroline M. Hoxby (1994, 1996) provides evidence thatprivate-school competition increasespublic-school effective ness. William N. Evans and Robert M. Schwab (1995) find that Catholic private schools are more effective in inducing studentsto complete high school and also to attend college.These studies take on the challenge of finding instrumentsthat predict well private-school attendance while being independent of unobserved determinants of educational achievement. Controversy exists concerning the quality of the instruments used. See Thomas J. Kane ( 1996) for a discussion of Hoxby's methodology. David N. Figlio and Joe A. Stone ( 1997) employ a different set of instrumentsthan Evans and Schwab and find that, at currentinput levels, religious private schools are less effective than public schools in producing achievement on standardizedexams in math and science but nonreligious private schools are more effective). See Witte (1996) and Figlio and Stone (1997) for references to other studies. 35 losses of the magnitude thiatemerge due to reduced peer quality in our computational model. Our anal ysis delineates the allocative effects of vouchers and demonstrates a potential for significant redistribution. A theoretical-economics literature on education is beginning to emerge. Charles A. M. de Bartolome ( 1990) develops a twoneighborhoodmodel of the provision of public educational inputs (quality) with two ability types and peer-group externalities. He shows hat the voting/locational equilibrium is inefficient because the median voter does not internalize the consequences of migration on peer groups in choosing the input level. No independent income variability characterizes students in his model. Raquel Fernandez and Richard Rogerson (1996) introduce income differences in a two-neighborhood model of the provision of inputs but abstractfrom peergroup effects. They examine the effects of redistributive policies and direct controls on inputs. Neither model has a private sector. Our analysis is differentiated by its consideration of a private sector and its two-dimensional, ont inuous type space. In a nolrnativeanalysis of student groupings in the presence of peergroup effects, RichardArnott and John Rowse ( 1987) show how a social plannerwould maximize the sum of achievements in allocating students of various abilities across classrooms. We analyze equilibrium outcomes, and most of our analysis is positive. Joseph E. Stiglitz ( 1974), Norman J. Ireland (1990), Ben Eden (1992), Charles F. Manski (1992), Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White (1995), Epple and Romano (1996), and GerhardGlomm and B. Ravikumar(1998) consider the consequences of a private sector for education. Stiglitz,Glomm and Ravikumnar, and Epple and Romano are concerned with the existence and properties of voting equilibria over taxfinanced, public-school expenditure in the presence of a private alternative. Ireland analyzes the effects of vouchers on utilities and the quality of the public alternative,taking the tax rate as exogenous. Individuals differ only by income, and the private alternative can be purchased continuously in all these analyses. Hence, the private sector is relatively passive, and issues of financial aid and differences in 36 MARCH 1998 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW studentability across schools do not arise.Our model is distinguished by having differences in ability and related peer-group effects, and by providing an active role for private-sector schools. Eden ( 1992) analyzes vouchers in a purely private market system of provision of education having two ability types and peergroup effects. A voucher equal to the difference between the social and private benefit of education to each ability type is shown to induce socially optimal provision of education. Key differences in our analysis include our consideration of the interaction between the public and private sectors, our exploration of the implications of continuous ifferences in ability and income, and our attention to positive issues. Manski ( 1992) pursues a computational analysis of vouc hers that also considers peer-group effects among other aspects of education (especially various objectives of public-school decision makers). Our models differ in a number of ways. Most importantly, we permit private schools to discriminate in their tuition policies, with many consequences. Rothschild and White ( 1995) analyze a competitive model with consumers also inputs to production (a peer-group effect), using higher education as their primary example.We share a concern for market pricing in the presence of an externality. Differences in our model, among others, are the presence of a public sector, a more detailed specification of peer effects and demand for education, and student variation in both ability and household income. Our attention to the implications for pricing, profitability, and school qualities of a peer-group effect deriving from student abilities, the allocation of students according to ability and household income and the related distribution of educational b enefits, and the effects of vouchers are not concerns in Rothschild and White.Private schools are cases of clubs with nonanonymous crowding due to the abilitydependent externality and schools' power to price it. Suzanne Scotchmer (1994) provides an excellent synthesis of this literature. We follow this literaturein our competitive specification of private schools as further discussed below. The next section presents the model. Section II develops the theoretical results. The computational results comprise Section III. Concluding remarks follow. An Appendix contains some of the detail. I. The Model Household income is denoted y, and each household has a student of ability b. The joint arginal distributionof ability and income in the population is denoted f(b, y) and is assunmedto be continuous and positive on its . (0, bmax X (0, Ymax]All students ] support, S attend a school since we assume that free public schooling is preferredto no schooling. The household decision maker's utilit y function, U( ), is increasing in numeraireconsumption and the educational achievement of the household's student, and it is continuous and twice differentiable in both arguments. Achievement, a = a (0, b), is a continuous and increasing function of the student's ability and the mean ability of the student body in the school attended,O. Let Ytdenote after-taxincome and ‘ The influence of ability on own educational achievement is well documented and not controversial. Eric Hanushek( 1986) provides an excellent survey. In the economics literature, Anita A. Summers and Barbara L. Wolfe (1977) and Vernon Henderson et al. (1978) find significant peer-group effects. Evans et al. (1992) adjust for selection bias in the formationof peer groups and show that it eliminates the significance of the peer group in explaining teenage pregnancy and dropping out of school. They are careful to point out that their results should not be interpretedas suggesting that peer-groupeffects do not xis t, but as demonstrating that scientific proof of those effects is inadequate. Note, too, that their work supports the notion that peer-group variables enter the utility function since a selection process does take place. The psychology literatureon peer-group effects in education also contains some controversy. In their survey paper, Richard L. Moreland and John M. Levine (1992) conclude: The fact that good students benefit from ability grouping, whereas poor students are harmedby it, suggests that the mean level of ability among classmates, as well as variability in their ability levels, could be an importantfactor.The results from several recent studies . . supportthis notion. This squares with our reading of the literature(Summers e and Wolfe, 1977; Henderson. t al. , 1978; Chen-Lin Kulik and James A. Kulik, 1982, 1984; Aage B. Sorensen, 1984; VOL. 88 NO. I EPPLE AND ROMANO:PRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION p tuition expenditure, the latter equal to zero if a public school is at tended. Thus, U = U(Y, – p, a(O, b)), with U1, U2, a,, and a2 all positive. The achievement function captures the peer-group effect in our model, discussed further below. To maintain simplicity and highlight the role of peer groups, a chool's quality is determined exclusively by the mean ability of its peer group. 6In ongoing work we are extending the model to include variation in educational inputs. U is also assumed to satisfy everywhere the â€Å"single-crossing† condition (SCI): (1) 0a OU/0 J yt > ?. Preferences for school quality might also depend on ability. We say preferences satisfy weak single crossing in ability if a Sorensen and MaureenT. Hallinan, 1986; Adam Gamoran and Mark Berends, 1987; Jennie Oakes, 1987; Gamoran, 1992). However, there are alternative interpretations (Robert E. Slavin, 1987, 1990). For simplicity, the possibility that dispersion in peer ability also affects achievement is not built into our model. Roland Benabou (1996b) explores the con sequences for economic growth of dispersion in human capital. 7 We believe this to be uncontroversial. hile we know W of no empirical studies that use direct measures of educational quality, a substantial empirical literature on the demand for educationalexpenditureexists. Although considerable diversity in magnitudes of estimates of the income elasticity of demand for educational spending are present, estimates using a variety of approaches find the ncome elasticity to be positive (Daniel Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro, 1989). 8 Households may consider education a consumption good, an investment good, or a combination of the two. Our formulation can be interpretedto accommodate any of these motives. However, for households not subject to borrowing constraints, a pure investment motive would imply a zero income elasticity of demand. For such households, this in turn would imply that the SCI condition in (1) would be only weakly satisfied. In light of the empir- OU/00 / Ob t OUIOyt whic h implies a weakly positive ability elasticity of demandfor quality.However, because the pertinent empirical evidence is mixed and scarce, we postpone restricting preferences in this regard until necessary. 9 In our computational model and to illustrateour more general theoretical results, we adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification of the utility function: (2) Hence, for students of the same ability, any indifference curve in the (0, p)-plane of a higher-income household cuts any indifference curve of a lower-income household from below. This condition corresponds to an income elasticity of demand for educational quality that is positive at all qualities for all types. One set of sufficient conditions on U for SCI is U11 0 and U12 2 0, with at least I one having strict inequality. 8 37 U = (yt-p)a(O, a(O, b) b) = 0Yb'6 g ; O y ; O. While(2) satisfiesSCI,it embodies he â€Å"neut tral† assumption of zero ability elasticity of demand: at O? /0 9b 0. Our computational results are not driven by own-ability effects on the demand for education. Keep in mind, too, that the theoretical results do not assume specification (2). A school's costs depend only on the number of students it enrolls, since inputs vary only with size. All schools, public and private,have the simple cost function: (3)C(k) = V(k) + F V' ;0 V†>o ical evidence suggesting the income elasticity to be positive, we conserve space in the development that follows by assuming that SCI is strict for all households. 9 Henderson et al. (1978) find no interaction between own ability and the benefits to an improved peer group, corresponding to 2IU/00&b= 0 in our model. Summers and Wolfe ( 1977) find some supportfor higherpeer-group benefits to lower-ability students, that is, 02U/la6ab < 0. Thus the literatureprovides limited evidence from which to draw conclusions. 38 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW where k denotes the number of attendingstudents.Technical differencesamong schools are not an element of our model (for simplicity). Hence, vouchers cannot drive technically inefficient schools from the market,an effect predicted by some proponents of vouchers (see footnote4). Let k* denotethe â€Å"efficientscale,† (4) k* ARGMIN[C(k)/k]. The presumptionof some economies of scale in education is realistic (Lawrence Kenny, 1982) and important. Otherwise, the private market would produce an infinite number of schools containing infinitely refined peer groups. Our model's equilibriumwill be consistent with the fact thatthe numberof types of studentsgreatlyexceeds the numberof schools.Public-sector schools offer free admission to all students. This open-enrollment policy leads to homogeneous public schools in equilibrium because we assume no frictions in public-school choice are present. Without equalization of 0's in public-sector schools, students would migrate to higher-0 schools to reap the benefits of a better peer group. With equalized 0's, no incentives for switching schools wit hin the public sector remain. We study the alternative of neighborhood school systems that impose residence requirementsin Epple and Romano (1995). Since all public schools will have the same , one can think of the public sector as consisting of one (possibly large) school. Publicsector schooling is financed by a proportional income tax, t, paid by all households, whether or not the household's child attends school in the public sector. Thus, Yt= (1 – t)y. The public sector chooses the (integer) number of schools and their sizes to minimize the total cost of providing schooling subjectto (3). The tax rate adjuststo balance the budget. Because households are atomistic, there is no tax consequence to a household's decision about school attendance. The public finance of chooling can then be largely suppressedin the analysis until the consideration of vouchers. The public sector is passive in this model for simplicity. Public-sector schools do not segment students by ability (tra ck), increase educational inputs to compete more effectively with the private sector, or behave strategically MARCH 1998 in any way. More realistic alternativesare importanttopics for research, some of which are discussed in the final section. Private-sectorschools maximize profits, and there is free entry anidexit. 10Modeling private schools as choosing an admission policy and uitionpolicy is convenient andinvolves no loss of generality. Student types are observable, implying that tuition and admission can be conditioned on ability and income as competition permits. 1 Private schools are an example of clubs with â€Å"non-anonymous crowding† (Scotchmer and Myrna H. Wooders, 1987; Scotchmer, 1997) because of the peer-groupeffect, and we model private-schoolbehaviorfollowing the literature on competitive club economies. In particular,private schools maximize profits as utility tak-ers(see Scotchmer, 1994), a generalization of price-taking when consumers (types) and productsdif fer. Private chools believe they can attract any studenttype by offering admission at a tuition yielding at least the maximum utility the student could obtain elsewhere. Let an i subscript, i = 1, 2, .. n, indicate a value for the ith private school. A zero subscript does the same for â€Å"the† public school. Let pi (b, y) denote the tuition necessary to enter school i, with po(b, y) = 0 V (b, y). Let ai (b, y) C [0, 1] denote the proportionof type (b, y) in the population that school i admits, 10Consideration of alternative objective functions to profitmaximization is reasonable,especially given the significant proportion of nonprofit schools.Some private pursuethe objective of quality schools might, for exa-mnple, maximization. Quality maximization, like profit maximization, is a member of a set of objective functions that are utility independent in the sense that they place no weight on offering any student types higher utility than the student's (equilibrium) reservation utility. Our preliminary analysis of this issue suggests that equilibtia where some private schools pursue objectives from this set other than profit maximization must also be competitive equilibria. Roughly, the failure of any school to maximize profits would permit ently by a profit-maximizingschool. The notion is that abilities can be determinedthrough testing, and required financial disclosures permit determination of household income. At least in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility, equation (2), students will have no incentive to underperformon exams, since tuition will be nonincreasing in ability in equilibrium (proved in Epple and Romano [1993]). Incentive compatibility in the reporting of income is more complex. EPPLE AND ROMANO:PRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION VOL. 88 NO. I with any ao(b, y) E [0, 1] â€Å"optimal† for the public school as determinedby the residualdemand for public education.A private school's profit-maximizationproblem can be written as (5) MAX rri Oj,kj,pj(b,y),aj(b,y) [pi(b, y)ai (b, y) f – s X f(b, y) db dy]-V(ki) –F subject to ai (b, y) E [0, 1] V (b, y); (5a) (5b) (b, y)a(Oi, U(y,-pi MAX 2 j b) ) p1(b, y), a(0j, b)) j * i; aj(b,y) > O is in the optimal set of j U(yt I0,1, †¦ ,n that (5b) hold for all (b, y) as we have specified (i. e. , including for nonadmitted students). Tuition charged to students for whom ai (b, y) = 0 is school i's only optimal choice (i. e. , nonadmittedstudents) is irrelevant. Note, too, that tuition such that (5b) holds with strict quality will be optimal. Private schools enter so long as they expect to make positive profits as utility takers. Because incumbent private schools maximize profitsas utility takers,entryresults if and only if wri> 0 for some incumbent school. The public-sector/private-sectorequilibriumis described by the following five conditions in addition to the government balanced-budget condition presented below in Section II, subsection C, for the more general case with vouchers. Condition UM: U*(b, y) – MAX U(y,-pi(b, V (b, y); 39 ie E 0,1,†¦ ,nI ai(b,y) y), a(0i, b)) > O is in the optimal set of i}V (b, y). (5c) (b, y)f(b, y) db dy; ki =fai Condition VIM: s [Oi, ki, pi(b, y), ai (b, y) ] satisfy (5), (Sd) O kjfbai(b, y)f(b, y) db dy. s Constraints(5c) and (5d) define, respectively, the size of the school's student body and the mean ability. Constraint (5a) precludes a school from admitting a negative number of a type or more of a type than exits in the population. â€Å"2Constraint(5b) imposes the utilitytaking assumption. Students' alternatives are limited to schools where they are admitted. Students always have the option of attending the public school. It is innocuous to require i= 1,2,†¦ ,n.Condition ZfH: 7ri = 0 i = 1, 2, †¦ , n. Conditions PSP: po(b, y) = V (b, y) ao(b, y) E [0, 1] V (b, y) 12 One might object to the presumptionthat â€Å"competitive schools† recognize the limit to demand. The presum ption is analogous to a monopolistically competitive firm's recognition of a limit on its demand curve. Dropping the presumptionwould lead to schools admitting infinite densities of some types. See Scotchmer (1994) for the analogue in the literatureon club goods. ao(b, y)f (b, y) db dy ko= s Go =-Af ko bao(b, y)f (b, y) db dy. s THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW 40 Condition MC: n xai (b,y)=1 V(b,y). i=OCondition UM summarizes household utility maximization. Households choose a mostpreferred private or public school, taking admission/tuition policies, school qualities, and taxes as given. Profit maximization of private schools (VIM) and the public-sector policies (PSP) have been discussed. While the entry assumption above is formally part of the definition of equilibrium, it is convenient to substitute the implication that private schools must earn zero profits (ZH). The last condition is market clearance, which uses the simplifying assumption above that free public schooling is preferredt o no schooling.II. Theoretical esults R A. Solution to the Private School's Problem Using UM, the first-order conditions for problem (5) can be written as follows: U(yt- pi , a(Oi, b)) (6a) =U*(b, ai (b, y) (6b) piC as f (6c) We now turn to the properties of equilibrium, assuming one exists. Existence issues are discussed below. Heuristic argumentshave been substituted for formal proofs when reasonable. The first result concerns the qualities of schools. b0,db [ (b, si) L sho0 V'(ki) yd 0 +io (Oi b) = n7i- – X PROPOSITION 1: A strict hierarchy of school qualities results, with the public sector V (b y); i i J ith equality combined with the equilibrium condition UM; pe () is student-type (b, y)'s reservation price for attending school of quality 0i. Condition (6b) characterizes optimal admission policies. † The term 77i0i – b) may ( be thoughtof as the marginalcost of admission operating via the peer-group externality in school i. From (6c), 77i[the Lagrangianmult iplier on (5d) ] equals the per-studentrevenue change in school i deriving from a change in 0i. The appropriatelyscaled change in 0i due to admitting student of ability b equals (b t 0k); its negative is then multiplied by rqj o obtain the peer-externalitycost.The peer cost of admitting students with ability below the school's mean is positive because the resulting quality decline dictates reduced tuition to all students, while the peer â€Å"cost† of admitting above-mean-ability students is negative. Let ( MCi (b) V'(ki ) + r7i 0 – b), which we term effective marginal cost. Types with reservation prices below MCi (b) are not willing to pay enough to cover their effective marginal cost and are not admitted. The school admits all of a type that has a reservationprice above effective marginal cost, and any ai E [0, 1] is optimal if pi* = MCi. 1 B. Properties of EquilibriumV (b, y); y) MARCH 1998 ai(b y) f(b y) db dy] Condition ( 6a) describes sclhooli' s optimnalut ition function, Pi* (b, y, Oi) and is just (5b) ‘3 Results (6b) and (6c) are found by substituting p* from (6a) into (5), and then forming a Lagrangianfunction to take account of (Sc) aind(Sd). Result (6b) is then derived by pointwise optimization over ai while taking account of the constraint (Sa). ‘4 In the upper and lower lines of (6b), the solution for ai is at a corner, and the first-orderconditions are also sufficient for a local maximum. In the middle line of (6b), where p * MCI and any ac (b, y) E [0, 11 satisfies the irst-orderconditions, V† sufficiently large implies local maximization. VOL. 88 NO. 1 EPPLE AND ROMANO:PRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION having the lowest-ability peer group: 0,, fJn-I > .. > > fJI > 00. Formal proof is in the Appendix. Here an economic interpretationis provided. All private schools must be of higher peer quality than schools in the public sector. Otherwise, no students would be willing to pay to attend any private school. Why mus t a strict hierarchy of private schools characterize equilibrium? If two private schools were of the same quality, then they would compete perfectly for students.Consequently, they would have the same effective marginal costs of admitting all types, and their tuitions (to all admitted students) would equal effective marginal costs. An opportunity to increase profits would exist by varying admissions/tuitions in such a way to either: (a) increase quality and admit a student body that values quality by more, or (b) decrease quality and admit a student body that values quality by less. In either case, the school differentiates itself in quality, at the same time attractinga student body that permits profitable price discrimination over the quality change.We sketch the example of a profitablequality improvement, beginning with schools having identical student bodies (the proof shows that this is without loss of generality). Let one school admit the same numberof (b2, Y2) types as it exp els of (bl, yl) types, where b2 > b, and Y2> Yl, implying an increase in 0 but no change in production costs, V(k) + F. Further, choose the types (which is always feasible) such that Y2 – YI > b2 – bi by enough that, using SCI, the (b2, Y2)-types value increased quality by more than the (bl, Yi)types, even though their abilities differ.This permits the school to charge the newly admitted students tuitions higher than their effective marginal costs because they are selected to value quality increases by more than the expelled students. The profit increase occurs because the new student body values the quality increase by more than would the original student body; 0 and rl rise in the school. It would not increase profits to substitute students in such a way that 0 rises without also changing the student body's average value of quality improvements, because tuitions equal 41 ffective marginal costs in the initially nondifferentiated schools. ‘5 This example assumes that a school substitutes students to increase quality, but alternativeprofitablesubstitutions exist that decrease quality, roughly, by also creating a lower-income studentbody. In either case, the argumentdepends on SCI. It also identifies the model's force for â€Å"diagonal stratification† (see the examples in Figure 1). As developed more fully below, this stratification results because students having relatively high income and low ability within a school cross subsidize relatively lowincome, high-ability students.The strict hierarchy of Proposition 1 supports the equity-relatedconcerns of some that private schools operate to the detriment of public schools by siphoning off higher-ability students. Whethera strict hierarchyis efficient is analyzed below. First we develop furtherthe positive properties of equilibrium. Proposition 2 describes equilibriumpricing, and Proposition 3 describes the resulting partition of types. Some definitions are useful. Let { (b, y) E SIai ( b, y) > 0 is optimal} denote the admission space of school i, i = 0, 1, †¦ , n (see Figure 1, for example). A locus of points (b,y) E A. n Aj, i ]j, assuming t exists, is referredto as a boundary locus between i and]. (Boundary loci have zero measure in S, as proved in Epple and Romano [1993]. ) Since any household prefers free public schooling to no schooling, the entire type space S is partitioned into admission spaces. Last, to avoid tedious qualification of statements for public-sector schools, we specify that MCo -0 for all (b, y). This notation is convenient since students see a zero cost of public education. PROPOSITION 2: (i) On a boundary locus between school i and j, pi MCi(b) and pj = MCj(b); pricing on boundary loci is strictly according to ability in private schools. ii) pi (b, y) > MCi (b) for off-boundarystudents who attend private school i; pricing off- ‘† Mathematically,beginning with equal O's,first-order effects on profits of varying admissions va nish, but the profit function is convex in some directions in [a(b, y), p(b, y)] -space, allowing a profit increase. 42 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW boundary loci depends on income in private schools. (iii) Every student attends a school that would maximize utility if all schools instead set pi equal to equilibrium MCi Jor all students. The allocation is as though effective marginal cost pricing prevails in private schools. 16See Epple and Romano (1993) for proof. Competition between private schools that share a boundary locus forces prices to effective marginalcosts for student-typeson the locus. These students are indifferentto attending the schools sharing the locus. Private schools then have no power to price discriminatewith respect to income on boundaryloci. Prices are, however, adjusted to differing abilities because private schools internalize the peergroup effect. Tuition to private school i decreases with ability at rate rRialong its boundary loci, reflecting the value of pe ergroup improvements of the school's student body.Moving inside a boundarylocus in a private school's admission space, students' preferences change in such a way that they would strictly prefer the school attended if it practiced effective marginal-cost pricing. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 establishes that private schools exploit this by increasing price. These students are also indifferent between the private school attended or their best alternative by (6a), but this is a result of discriminatory pricing. Generally, then, price depends both on ability and income within admission spaces. â€Å"7 Part (iii) of Proposition 2 follows because it is profitable for a private school to be sure o attractany student whose reservation price 16 The statementsregard the equilibriumeffective marginal cost. Income effects would cause these costs to change if tuition equaled effective marginal cost for all students. This has distributional (but not efficiency) implications. ‘7 While there a re no published studies of the allocation of financial aid by income and ability among private elementary and secondary schools, there is evidence on the allocation of financial aid by colleges and universities. There the evidence is that both ability and family income are significant determinantsof whether and how much financial aid is received (J.Brad Schwartz, 1986; Sandra R. Baum and Saul Schwartz, 1988; Charles T. Clotfelter, 1991). MARCH 1998 exceeds the school's effective marginal cost. The student allocation's link to effective marginal costs, and hence abilities, will be shown to be efficient (except for the public sector). The income-related price discrimination that occurs does not disrupt the allocation consistent with effective marginal-cost pricing; rather,it is purely redistributive. While this income-related price discrimination is of the first degree (a la Pigou), its magnitude is limited by competition for students among the differentiatedschools.Near a boundaryin a school's admission space, a student's preference for the school attended would be slight under effective marginal-cost pricing, so that the admitting school can capture little rent. The numberand sizes of private schools then determine their powier to price discriminate over income. All private schools have student bodies less than k* by a similar argumentto that in more standardmonopolistically competitive equilibria. â€Å"8Here school i's marginal-revenuecurve can be constructed by ordering from highest to lowest students' reservation prices minus peer costs [i. e. , p* + rbi(b – Of)], and thus the associated ownward-slopingaverage revenue curve may be derived. Zero profits then implies a scale below k*. If we let k* decline, then private schools become more numerous and less differentiated (have closer 0's), and incomerelated price discriminationdeclines. Now consider the partition of types into schools. We say stratificationby income (SBI) holds if, for any two househ olds having students of the same ability, one household's choice of a higher-O school implies it has a weakly higher income than the other household. Analogously, stratification by ability (SBA) is present if, holding income fixed, the household that chooses a higher-Oschool must ave a student of weakly higher ability. The combination of SBI and SBA implies a diagonalized partitionas, for example, in Figure 1. PROPOSITION 3: (i) SBI characterizes equilibrium. (ii) If preferences satisfy weak c single crossing in ability (W-SCB) and m7, 18 The points made here are proved in Epple and Romano (1993). EPPLE AND ROMANO:PRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION VOL. 88 NO. I ?72 ? ‘- ? 71, then SBA also characterizes equilibrium. ‘9 To confirm part (i), consider two households with students of the same ability but dif- feringincomes y2 ; yI. In the (0, p) -plane, indifference curves of a household are upward loping. For the same ability, SCI implies that any indifference curve of y2 cuts any indifference curve of yl from below. Allocations are as if tuitions equal effective marginal costs [part (iii) of Proposition 2]. Thus, the choice between schools i andj may be representedin the ( 0, p ) -plane as a choice between ( Oi, MCi (b)) and (0j, MCj(b)). If Oj; Oi, it must be that MCj(b) ; MCi (b) if either type chooses i. A standard single-crossing argument then applies to complete the proof. Part (ii) is proved in the Appendix; here we provide some intuition. Assume first that the demand for quality is independent of ability (e. . , as in the Cobb-Douglas specification) and that all private schools give the same discount to ability along their boundary loci (i. e. , schools' 7's are the same). Holding nominal household income fixed, real income would rise with student ability due to tuition discounts at all private schools. SBA would then result by the same logic explaining SBI. Hence, the combination of a positive income elasticity (SCI) and discounts to ability alone would cause both SBI and SBA, the diagonalized partition as in Figure 1. Relatively high-income and lowability students cross subsidize relatively low-income and high-ability students in rivate schools. The argument holds more strongly if the 7's strictly ascend or if WSCB holds strictly. However, neither condition is necessary for SBA, nor do any of our other results require these conditions or SBA. It may be possible absent these conditions to get cases having nonmonotonic boundary loci in the (b, y) -plane. 20 9 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to investigate bid-rentfunctions (see e. g. , MasahisaFujita, 1989), which ultimately led to part (ii) of Proposition 3. 20 The alternativeto W-SCB implies that lower-ability types are willing to pay more for a better peer group, and he alternativeto weakly ascending q's implies that lower- 43 We now turnto normativeresults which are quite intuitive. Again, see Epple and Romano (1993) for the formal analysis. Pareto efficiency requires: (i) a student allocation that internalizes the peer-group externality given the nmtmberf schools, and (ii) entry as long o as aggregate household net willingness to pay for an allocation with one more school exceeds the change in all schools' costs. An equilibrium without a public sector would satisfy condition (i) but not condition (ii). Effective marginal cost includes the marginal value of he peer group externality, implying that MCi (b) equals the social marginal cost of attendance at school i by a student of ability b. A purely private-school equilibrium then satisfies efficiency condition (i) by part (iii) of Proposition 2. However, entry to the point of zero profits entails externalities so that efficient entry [condition (ii)] fails to hold in a fully private equilibrium. An entrantcapturesthe full value of its product to the studentbody it admits but ignores utility changes of nonadmitted students and profit changes of other schools resulting from the r eallocation. ‘ Fixed costs, quality schools give bigger discounts to ability. Either would tend to work against pure ability stratification, though Proposition I implies that some degree of ability stratificationwould be present. It is desirable to demonstrate SBA without assuming ascending q's, since these values are endogenous. However, providing general primitive conditions for SBA independentof assumptionsconcerning the equilibrium q's is difficult, because their equilibrium values depend on the entire distribution of types in the population. For the Cobb-Douglas case and ssuming independence of income and ability in the population, we (Epple and Romano, 1993) have shown SBA without assuming weakly ascending 7's. 21 The comparison of the equilibrium number of schools in a fully private equilibrium to the Paretoefficient number entails a trade-off. The entrant ignores the lost revenues and cost savings to other schools from the students that; t admits. Since almost every st udent ati tracted away from incumbent schools is inframarginal (i. e. , tuition exceeds effective marginal cost), the net effect here of entry is negative, tending to cause too much entry.Opposing this is the entrant's failure to capture the full returnsfrom increased varie-tyof school qualities that results. Altlhoughthe entrant fully price discriminates to the students it admits, it cannot tax other students for the adjustments in the incumbent schools' qualities. A net benefit to other students is likely to result because the incumbent schools will better accommodate preferences. 44 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW hence the finite size of an entrant,underlie the entry externalities as in many models of monopolistic competition. Introductionof the free public sector implies eviations from both efficiency conditions. In general, the public sector displaces multiple differentiatedprivate schools, substitutingthe equivalent of one â€Å"large† homogeneous school. This effective red uction in the number of schools is without attention to costs and benefits, generally implying a deviation from efficiency condition (ii). Holding fixed the number of schools in the public-private equilibrium (and counting the public sector as one school), zero pricing of public schooling violates condition (i). By just reallocating students between the public sector and private school 1 near their shared oundary locus, Paretian gains are feasible. Reference to the upper panel of Figure 1 from our computational equilibrium may help clarify the argument. Gains would result from shifting into private school I relatively lowerability students below but near the boundary locus, students for whom the marginal social cost in the public sector is positive. These students are nearly indifferent between the two schools when facing the social cost of attending the private school but a tuition (zero) below the social cost of attending the public school. Students near the boundary locus and tte nding the private school may also be of sufficiently high ability that the social â€Å"cost† of attending the public school is negative. Gains from shifting such studentsinto the public sector are then also feasible. Such students exist in our computational model, the rough prescriptionbeing to rotatethe boundarylocus counterclockwise at the point of ability having zero social marginal cost in the public school. Collecting these results, we have the following proposition. efficient. (ii) The public-private-sector equilibrium has neither an efficient number of schools, nor an efficient student allocation iven the number of schools. When fixed costs of schooling are small, the departure from efficiency in a fully private equilibrium will be correspondingly small. Part (i) of Proposition 4 can then be interpreted as making a case for private schooling and the vouchers we study. However, we have some reservations concerning this efficiency result. First, we are sympathetic to th e view of many that access to a quality education is a right and serves as a means to limit historical inequities. Second, longer-run externalities from education not considered by private schools, like reduced crime, may be present.For these reasons, we explore the consequences of vouchers on all types instead of just providing aggregate measures. A somewhat distinct concern arises because exact equilibrium exists only in special cases. The interpretationof the efficiency results in the approximateequilibriumwe study is discussed in subsection D, below. C. Vouchers We examine tax-financedcash awardsto all those attending private school. 22 No role for vouchers is present in the tuition-free public t sector. Refo-rmulate he model by everywhere adding the amount of the voucher, v, to yt for households that choose a private school.The government's budget constraintis: tyf (b, y) db dy (7) s This positive externality will tend to cause too little entry. We believe that too many or too few private schools are possible, but we have not proved this. vf(b,y)dbdy fJ – PROPOSITION 4: (i) The allocation in a fuilly private equilibrium is (Pareto) efficient given the number of schools; the equilibrium number of schools is not, however, generally MARCH 1998 . U AlU UA2U . +sr[s N U . +r , / B 7(k 22 Our model permits households to retain as income any excess of the voucher amount over the tuition paid to he private school of choice, thereby avoiding considerable complication. VOL. 88 NO. 1 45 EPPLE AND ROMANO:PRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION where N and k denote, respectively, the costminimizing number and size of schools in the public sector that satisfy demandfor public education. Vouchers lower the real price of private education and increase the demand for it. We examine the effects of vouchers in our computationalmodel. the results will provide at least suggestive evidence about the impact of policy interventions. However, scant empirical evidence exists on some important parameters of the odel. D. Existence of Equilibriumand an ApproximateEquilibrium We require specifications for the density of income and ability, the utility and achievement functions, and the cost function for education. As we discuss in the Appendix, exact equilibrium generally fails to exist due to the integer number of private schools. We examine an approximate equilibrium in our computational analysis. Our â€Å"epsilon-competitive equilibrium' requires that no (utility-taking) private school, incumbentor entrant,could increase profitsby more than s. Let 7rax and .. min denote the maximum and minimum profits arned by incumbent schools [which maximize profits overp(b, y) and a (b, y) locally], and replace Zfl in the definitionof equilibrium with MAX [irmax, Xrmax -lrmin – rminl c Here lrmax equals the maximum potential profits to an entrant,and the maximum of the second two terms in the brackets equals the largest feasible profit increase by an incumbent s chool. The revised definition of equilibrium continues to require UM, PSP, MC, and local profit maximization by incumbent private schools [i. e. , (6a) – (6c)]. Last, the number of private schools is the minimum number satisfying these requirements.The epsilon equilibriumretains all the positive propertiesof an exact equilibriumexcept that private schools could gain s in profits via global adjustments. The allocation of students in a fully private equilibriumwould then continue to satisfy efficiency condition (i). M III. Computational quilibrium odeland E R Illustrative esults We develop a computationalmodel to illustrate our results, to examine vouchers, and to explore issues for which comparative-static analysis may yield ambiguous results. We calibrate it to existing empirical evidence so that A. Specification and CalibrationWe assume that [n (b) is distributedbivar- iate normal with mean LbJand covariance matrix 2 01b P UbUy P bUy aY J To calibratethe distributionof incom e, we use mean ($36,250) and median ($28,906) income for households from U. S. census datafor 1989. With units of income in thousands of dollars, these imply that ,uy = 3. 36 and ay = 0. 68. We adopt specification (2) for the combined utility-achievement function. To calibrate the ability distribution we presume that educational achievement determines futureearnings and that the benchmarkeconomy is in a steady state. First, define normed achievement, aN, s our achievement function raised to the power 1/3 and multiplied by a constant, aN Y Ka â€Å"‘ = KO l'b. 23 Then, a studentwith ability b attending a school with a peer quality of 0 is presumedto have futureannualearnings (E) given by ln E = ln aN= In K + (y/o/)ln 0 + ln b. This normalization is such that a percentage change in ability leads to the same percentage change in dollars earned. Henderson et al. ( 1978) reportthe change in achievement percentile that results from moving students from classes stratified by ability to mixed 23 The constant of proportionality, K, is arbitrary. A onvenient scaling is to set K = E[ b -‘. This scaling has the propertythat, if all students in the populationwere to attend the same school (i. e. , 0 = E[b]), then normed achievement would equal ability (i. e. , aN = b). 46 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW classes. An elasticity of achievement with respect to peer ability that is 30 percent as large as the elasticity with respect to own ability is representative of the results they report. We adopt the somewhat conservativevalue of y/l 0. 2. To complete the calibration of the distribution of ability, we then assume that the observed household-income distributionis the ncome distribution that emerges in a steadystate equilibrium in our benchmark model. 24 This yields Ilb = 2. 42 and b = 0. 61. Thus, mean and median ability are 13. 6 and 11. 3, respectively, and the standard deviation of ability is 9. 1. 25 GarySolon (1992) and David J. Zimmerman (1992) provide evidence on the correlationbea tween father's income and son's incomrre,nd they both find that the best point estimate of this correlationis approximrately. 4. Intergen0 erationalcorrelationin income arises from two sources:correlationbetween householdincome nd student ability and, for given ability, correlation between income and quality of school attended. Hence, SBI suggests that the intergenerationalcorrelationin incomes is an upper bound on the correlationbetween parent's income and child's ability. For purposes of sensitivity analysis, we then assume that p E [0, 0. 4]. For our benchmarkcase, we set p = 0, More precisely, we let the distribution of ability be lognormal, and we approximateby assuming that this generates a lognormal distributionof earnings. We set the first two moments of the distribution of earnings equal to the irst two moments of the distribution of income. That is, a we choose 11h nd cb such that our benchmarkequilibrium has E[aN] = E[y]lm and Var[aN] = Var[y]/m2. T he constantm is the ratio of employed workersper household to the number of students per household (m = 2. 6 in 1990). The distribution of earnings will not be exactly lognormal because of the discrete difference in schools attended, even though the distribution of ability is presumed to be lognormal. If every student attended public school in the benchmarkmodel, and hence faced the same 0, earnings would be exactly lognormal.The approximation is a good one because 90 percent of the students do attend public schools as we will see. 25 Ability can be related to IQ. Using IQ – X(100, 256), one obtains In b = -1. 38 + 0. 038(IQ). In our novoucher steady state, this implies that a workerwith an IQ of 100 has expected income of $22,074, and a 10-point increase in his IQ increases expected income to $32,510. See the discussion in what follows relatingto Figure 6 and the calculation of expected steady-state income conditional on ability. 24 MARCH 1998 which is particularly onvenient for our steadyc state calibrationof the model.This completes the calibrationof f(b, y). We now complete the calibration of preferences. The Cobb-Douglas specification implies unitary price and income elasticities for school quality, 0. Given the absence of empirical evidence on the demand for quality, these are plausible focal values and are consistent with estimates of demand for school expenditure (see e. g. , Theodore Bergstrom et al. , 1982). This function also implies thatthe marginal rate of substitutionbetween school quality and the numeraire is invariant to own ability. Empirical evidence is mixed about whether an improvementin peer group is more eneficial to high- or low-ability students. Hence, our model's assumption that the effect of peer group is not biased toward either highor low-ability types seems an appropriate choice for a baseline model. If school quality could be purchasedat a constant price per unit of quality, each household's expenditure on education relativ e to total expenditureon other goods would be y/( 1 + -y). The existing share of aggregate disposable personal income in the United States that is spent on education is approximately 0. 056. Hence, we set y = 0. 06. Using y/P = 0. 2 from above, the calibrated tility-achievement function is then U = (Yt – P)0006b0. 30. We chose a cost function that is quadratic in the percentage of students (or households) a school serves: F + V(k) = 12 + 1,300k + 13,333k2, with parameters set as follows. Expenditure per student in public schools in 1988 was $4,222 (Statistical Abstract, 1991 p. 434) and there was 1/2studentper household (Statistical Abstract, 1992 pp. 46, 139). We specified our benchmark case to have four private schools and chose parametervalues such that average cost in equilibriumwas approximately$4,200 per pupil. 26 Experimentation indicated that 6 We have presented the cost function in terms of the percentage of students served or, equivalently, the per- VOL. 88 NO. I EP PLE AND ROMANO:PRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION equilibriumpropertiesare not very sensitive to the benchmark number of schools, but rather are sensitive to the minimum of the average cost of schooling. We set e = 4. 2. This is the minimum value sufficient to assure existence of epsilon equilibrium for voucher values varying from zero to $4,200 per student. 27 B. Results For our benchmark equilibrium with no voucher, the public sector has 90 percent of the student population, and the four private chools combined serve the remainder. The actual U. S. percentage of students enrolled in public schools during this period equaled 88 percent. Increasing p from 0 to 0. 4 reduces public-sector attendance to 88 percent. Effects on other variables of so changing p are also small, and the results that follow are for p = 0. centage of households served, k. In terms of k, average cost reaches a minimum at $2,100, with k* = 0. 03; $2,100 can then be interpretedas the average cost per household. There are twice as many households as students in the United States. Letting s denote the numberof studentsand ubstituting s = k/2, one sees that the minimum of the average cost per student is $4,200. In our presentation,we focus on per-student measures of tuition and costs; the related per-household measures are simply half those of the per-studentvalues. 27 This value is about 7 percent of the cost of a school operating at a scale that minimizes cost per student. Relative to fixed cost, ? is approximately 35 percent. Of course, a minimal E, however measured, is desirable. We have studied how the minimum e varies as we vary efficient school scale, k*, while holding average cost constant.We find that the requisite e to support equilibrium varies approximatelyproportionatelywith k* if fixed cost is varied proportionately with k*. This suggests, as we would expect, that e can be made as small as desired if k * is made sufficiently small. We have also investigated increasing fixed cost while holding k* and minimum average cost constant. This tends to reduce the ratio of e to fixed cost but increases the absolute magnitude of e required to sustain equilibrium. Our investigation reveals that substantive findings from the computational model re not sensitive to the choice of k* or the relative magnitude of fixed to variable cost. Rather, the key aspect of costs is the value of average cost at the minimum, and as discussed in the text, this value is based on observed school costs. The problem with pursuinga calibrationthat further lowers e is that it leads to a computationally unmanageable number of schools for large vouchers. 47 Othercomputationalresults are presentedin Figures 1-6. The upperpanel of Figure 1 presents the boundary loci and admission sets in type space, in addition to the equilibrium O's nd k's. Here and in some other figures, both absolute and percentile ability scales are provided for perspective. The lower panel displays the allocation for a vouch er of $1,800. The linear boundary loci derive from the Cobb-Douglas specification. For results we present, intersections of boundaryloci, if any, occur very near the bounds of the support of type space. S

Aids&HIV essays

Aids&HIV essays HIV/AIDS Virus Paper There our many different kinds of fatal diseases in the world. However, the AIDS virus has infected over 600,000 people in the United States since 1981, and over 900,000 people have been infected with HIV as well. Half of the people living with HIV will develope AIDS within ten years. From these statistics you can see that HIV and the AIDS virus has affected many people lives. These next few paragraphes should give you a little bit of insight and basic knowledge of the virus know as HIV later to be AIDS. HIV stands for Human Immunodeficiency Virus, HIV is the virus that leads to AIDS. HIV is a slow virus which means that there is an interval between the initial infection and the presence of symptoms. The intervel between the initial infection could sometimes be years. HIV infects the CD4+T cells and begins to multiply rapidly. The virus kills immune system cells causing you to get sick. Now on to the AIDS virus. AIDS means Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, which is the final stage of HIV infection. AIDS is a disease developed by a person living with HIV, which is a viral organism. The term AIDS applies to the most advanced stages of HIV infection. Although an HIV-positive person is positive doesn't mean that he/she has AIDS, most people develop AIDS as a result of their HIV infection. HIV is transmitted most commonly through sexual contact. However, the virus can also be spread through blood to blood contact, such as sharing used needles or getting a blood transfusion. A common thought that people have is if the virus can be transmitted by touch, the answer is no. Studies have shown that HIV in not transmitted through casual contact such as touching or sharing towels, bedding, telephones, swimming pools, or toilet seats. Their has been no sign of transmittion through kissing, sweat, tears, urine or feces. It should be well known that it is not ...

Effects of the American Revolution on Britain

Effects of the American Revolution on Britain American success in the Revolutionary War created a new nation, while British failure tore away part of the empire. Such consequences were inevitably going to have impacts, but historians debate their extent compared with those of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which would test Britain soon after their American experience. Modern readers might expect Britain to have suffered greatly as a result of losing the war, but its possible to argue that the hostilities were survived so well that Britain could fight a very long war against Napoleon soon after. Financial Effect Britain spent a huge amount of money fighting the Revolutionary War, sending the national debt soaring and creating a yearly interest of nearly 10 million pounds. Taxes had to be raised as a result. The trade that Britain had relied on for wealth was severely interrupted. Imports and exports experienced large drops and the following recession caused stocks and land prices to plummet. Trade was also affected by naval attacks from Britain’s enemies, and thousands of merchant ships were captured. On the other hand, wartime industries, such as the naval suppliers and the part of the textile industry that made uniforms, experienced a boost. Unemployment fell as Britain struggled to find enough men for the army, which caused them to hire German soldiers. British privateers experienced as much success preying on enemy merchant ships as almost any of their opponents. The effects on trade were short term. British trade with the new USA rose to the same level as trade with the colonies by 1785, and by 1792 trade between Britain and Europe had doubled. Additionally, while Britain gained an even larger national debt, it was in a position to live with it, and there were no financially motivated rebellions like those in France. Indeed, Britain was able to support several armies during the Napoleonic wars and field its own instead of paying for other people. Its been said that Britain actually prospered from losing the war. Effect on Ireland Many in Ireland opposed British rule and saw the American Revolution as a lesson to be followed and a set of brothers fighting against Britain. While Ireland had a parliament, only Protestants voted for it and the British could control it, which was far from ideal. Campaigners for reform in Ireland reacted to the struggle in America by organizing groups of armed volunteers and a boycott of British imports. The British were afraid a full-blown revolution would emerge in Ireland  and made concessions. Britain relaxed its trade restrictions on Ireland, so they could trade with British colonies and freely export wool, and reformed the government by allowing non-Anglicans to hold public office. They repealed the Irish Declaratory Act, which had secured Irelands dependence on Britain while granting full legislative independence. The result was that Ireland remained part of the British Empire. Political Effect A government that can survive a failed war without pressure is rare, and Britains failure in the American Revolution led to demands for constitutional reform. The hardcore of government was criticized for the way it had run the war and for the apparent power it had, with fears that Parliament had ceased to represent the views of the people- except for the wealthy- and was simply approving everything the government did. Petitions flooded from the Association Movement demanding a pruning of the king’s government, the expansion of voting, and a redrawing of the electoral map. Some even demanded universal manhood suffrage. The Association Movement had huge power around early 1780, and it achieved widespread support. That did not last long. In June 1780 the Gordon Riots paralyzed London for almost a week with destruction and murder. While the cause of the riots was religious, landowners and moderates were frightened away from supporting more reform and the Association Movement declined. Political machinations throughout the early 1780s also produced a government with little inclination for constitutional reform. The moment passed. Diplomatic and Imperial Effect Britain may have lost 13 colonies in America, but it retained Canada and land in the Caribbean, Africa, and India. It began to expand in these regions, building what has been called the Second British Empire, which eventually became the largest dominion in world history. Britain’s role in Europe was not diminished, its diplomatic power was soon restored, and it was able to play a key role in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars despite the loss across the sea.

Nanoflares Keep Things Hot on the Sun

Nanoflares Keep Things Hot on the Sun One thing we all know about the Sun: its incredibly hot. The surface (the outermost layer of the Sun that we can see) is 10,340 degrees Fahrenheit (F), and the core (which we cant see) is 27 MILLION degrees F. Theres another part of the Sun that lies between the surface and us: its the outermost atmosphere, called the corona.Its some 300 times hotter than the surface. How can something farther away and out in space be hotter? You would think it would actually be cooling off the farther away it gets from the Sun.   This question of how the corona gets so hot has kept solar scientists busy for a long time, trying to find an answer. It was once assumed that the corona heated gradually, but the cause of the heating was a mystery.   The Sun is heated from within by a process called fusion. The core is a nuclear furnace, fusing atoms of hydrogen together to make atoms of helium. The process releases heat and light, which travel through the Suns layers until they escape from the photosphere. The atmosphere, including the corona, lie above that. It should be cooler, but its not. So, what could possibly heat the corona? One answer is nanoflares. These are tiny cousins of the big solar flares that we detect erupting from the Sun. Flares are sudden flashes of brightness from the Suns surface. They release incredible amounts of energy and radiation. Sometimes flares are also accompanied by massive releases of superheated plasma from the Sun called coronal mass ejections. These outbursts can cause whats called space weather  (such as displays of northern and southern lights)  at Earth and other planets. Nanoflares are a different breed of solar flare. First, they erupt constantly, crackling along like countless little hydrogen bombs. Second, they are very, very hot, getting up to 18 million degrees Fahrenheit. Thats hotter than the corona, which is usually a few million degrees F.   Think of them as a very hot soup, bubbling along on the surface of a stove, warming the atmosphere above it. With nanoflares, the combined heating of all those constantly blowing tiny explosions (which are as powerful as 10-megaton hydrogen bomb explosions) is likely why the coronosphere is so hot.    The nanoflare idea is relatively new, and only recently have these little explosions been detected. The concept of nanoflares was first proposed in the early 2000s, and tested beginning in 2013 by astronomers using special instruments on sounding rockets. During the short flights, they studied the Sun, looking for evidence of these tiny flares (which are only a billionth of the power of a regular flare). More recently, the NuSTAR mission, which is a space-based telescope sensitive to x-rays, looked at the Suns x-ray emissions and found evidence for the nanoflares.   While the nanoflare idea seems to be the best one that explains coronal heating, astronomers need to study the Sun more in order to understand how the process works. They will watch the Sun during solar minimum- when the Sun is not bristling with sunspots that can confuse the picture. Then,  NuSTAR and other instruments will be able to get more data to explain just how millions of tiny little flares going off just above the solar surface can heat the thin upper atmosphere of the Sun.

Yorkshire Tourism Investment Research Coursework

Yorkshire Tourism Investment Research - Coursework Example However, the region has a lot of untapped potential towards offering more quality and increase revenues through a few unexplored avenues. The Yorkshire region is home to some beautiful landscapes and a vast countryside that can offer numerous opportunities for visitors to experience nature (Beeton, 2010). Tapping the tourist element in the rural countryside will also be economically beneficial to the local communities besides providing them a unique opportunity to showcase their tradition and culture. Any development of eco-tourism in coordination with these local communities must however be implemented through a sustainable framework that can ensure long-term growth and prevent any damage to the local environment. Key Drivers and Objectives ‘Rural tourism’ is a relatively new concept in the United Kingdom (UK) whose importance and growth potential were recognized by the government. Grants such as the ‘Yorkshire Forward’ are available to individuals and firm s that aspire to develop a tourism related business in the rural parts of Yorkshire. The ‘Yorkshire Forward’ grants are offered through the RDPE (Rural development program for England) (Hall, 2010). The grant program was initiated after an extensive research by the RDPE which sensed the need to enhance the quality of tourist facilities and accommodation available in the rural regions of Yorkshire. Grants can fund up to 50% of the total cost of such projects up to a maximum amount of ?25,000 upon fulfilling a few conditions (Goodall, 2008). The key focus is to improve the standards of serviced accommodation, self-catered hotels and rural pubs by introducing new bedrooms of better quality or upgrading any current facilities that may help the business develop further. Any such initiative must help develop a long-term relationship with customers so that they may prefer to visit again, thereby improving the prospects of the regional economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, the importance of tourism in Yorkshire’s economy cannot be underestimated. The sector contributed over ?5 billion in 2008, with over 90% of the visitors originating from the UK. Amongst these tourists, day visitors contributed around 45% of the revenues while the rest was contributed by staying tourists. International tourists also accounted for ?400 million in revenues (Holman, 2008). The peak season for tourism is summer although trips to the countryside can be organized throughout the year. Another important segment that could prove beneficial for rural tourism is business tourism, which constitutes over a quarter of tourism in Yorkshire. Beeton (2005) says that events such as corporate meetings and conferences can be organized in the countryside and promoted effectively as a low-cost and environment friendly alternative to conventional solutions. There are however several issues and risk factors that must also be evaluated and minimized efficiently to embolden the confid ence among tourists regarding rural Yorkshire. While the rural parts enjoy a dense road network in terms of connectivity, accessibility through air is relatively underdeveloped. Improving international connectivity and encouraging tour operators is an important consideration if rural tourism is to become a popular success. Local airports like the Leeds Bradford and Robin Hood must be upgraded as required to cater to domestic and overseas travelers and connectivity from these airports to any part of the Yorkshire region must be improved (Coles, 2008). Occupancy rates in rural Yorkshire are also lower than the regional or national average (at 60% and 82% respectively) (Spencer, 2008). Thus, any promotional initiatives and development projects must consider the aspect of improving

Cause and Effect of Race on Life Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Cause and Effect of Race on My Life - Essay Example It is not essential that everybody has to face certain problems in association with these characteristics but for me, the situation was on the negative side. I belong to the Middle East and I chose to pursue my studies in the United States with the prospect of achieving a better future. Though it is believed by many that racism is not a major factor which affects the living of a person in today’s world but in my case, my life was very much affected by my race. I was one of the very few people in my college in the United States who came from the Middle East. My race was one of the major reasons why not many people in my class wanted to befriend me. I was new in the country and an international student and it was a period when I actually needed help and support. It was very difficult on my part to communicate with people because I perceived that most of them did not want to engage in conversations with or assist me in getting used to the place. I still remember the time when I a sked a college mate to give me his notes to which he flatly refused and did not even speak any further. The concept that I actually realized was that the whites preferred sticking to their own groups. This was the beginning but with time things did change and we got on better terms after a few months. The level of trust was not very high but I actually communicate with them. We were colleagues but not friends who would actually go out or attend parties together. It cannot be denied that my race did assist me in many matters. I formed a very strong bond and actually made really good friends with people who belonged to different races and were international students like me.

Politics - Is the War on Terror an invented conflict Essay

Politics - Is the War on Terror an invented conflict - Essay Example This single incident was by itself proof that the threat of terrorism was real enough, perceptible enough and urgent enough to merit the highest degree of priority, attention and action. â€Å"Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.† (Bush, 2001, pp. 5) The President then went on to state in no uncertain terms that the United States â€Å"is fighting a war against terrorism of global reach.† (Bush, 2001, pp. 5) Subsequent references to a concerted fight against terrorism on a worldwide scale by the President and others of the administration finally led to the coinage of the now formal and widely accepted term ‘Global War on Terrorism’ along with its acronym GWOT. If the 9/11 attacks were not ‘invented’, then it follows logically that all efforts to fight and eradicate those who were behind the attack and others who pursue the path of terrorism, are also real enough. The objective of this paper is to present an analysis of what makes the Global War on Terrorism a very real effort fighting a very real danger to the world. The paper will, however, also examine the drawbacks and weaknesses in the formulation of GWOT, that have resulted in the misconception that the entire effort is an invented one – that it is the fantasy of some collective devious mind. In order to be able to do so, we must first examine what is exactly implied by the term ‘Global War on Terrorism’. ‘War’ as implied in the GWOT is a very different kind of war compared to conventional warfare. Traditionally, war has involved military conflict between well defined entities such as states or insurgent groups trying to take over the control of a state. The primary medium for war has been combat between fielded military forces, be they regular (state) or